Imperatives without imperator by Schütz, Anton
 
 
Birkbeck ePrints: an open access repository of the 





Schütz, Anton. (2009) Imperatives without 
imperator 
Law and Critique 20 (3), (2009): 233-243. 
 
 
This is an author-produced version of a paper published in Law and Critique 
(ISSN 0957-8536). This version has been peer-reviewed but does not include 
the final publisher proof corrections, published layout or pagination. 
 
The final definitive version of this paper has been published in Law and 
Critique 20 (3), November 2009  
Copyright © 2009 Springer Verlag Publications. 
The original publication is available at: www.springerlink.com  
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10978-009-9053-2 
 
All articles available through Birkbeck ePrints are protected by intellectual 
property law, including copyright law. Any use made of the contents should 
comply with the relevant law.  
 
 
Citation for this version: 
 
Schütz, Anton. (2009) Imperatives without imperator 
London: Birkbeck ePrints. Available at: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/871 
 
 
Citation for the publisher’s version: 
 
Schütz, Anton. (2009) Imperatives without imperator 
Law and Critique 20 (3): 233-243. 
 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk 
Contact Birkbeck ePrints at lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk 
 
Birkbeck ePrints 




Dr Anton Schütz 
School of Law  
Birkbeck, University of London 
Malet Street 
London WC1E 7HX 
Tel: +44 (0)207 631 6509 
Fax: +44 (0)207 631 6506 
Email: a.schutz@bbk.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT:  Schmitt’s theologisation of sovereignty has been subjected, fifty years later, to a ‘quarter 
turn’ by Foucault’s move from issues of domination to issues of government. After a further thirty years, 
radicalising Foucault, Agamben’s archaeology of economy adds another ‘quarter turn’: the structure that 
emerges once the old European conjugality of facticity and validity, of praxis and being, emptied of all 
bonds, links, and loops, gives way to the bare opposition ‘bipolarity’. The new constellation provides the 
old legal-theoretical (kelsenian) problem of rules unsuspended from a ruler who would authoriee them, 
with a new, unexpected, political content and with a change of epistemic paradigm. 




The suggestion that the human sciences are undergoing a paradigm change focuses, along 
foucaultian lines, on a shift of emphasis by which the ‘groping’ inquiry into documented 
data gives way to a measurable process of learning, performance and carrying out.1 An 
attempt to gain insight into the effects of the archive (or ‘arch-past’) on the present is 
replaced by an effort to detect possibilities of control.  
Agamben identifies the new a-historic paradigm with neuronal-system or genetic-
code type objects. But are these objects more than mere show-cases of a more general 
trend? Once its distinctive move is identified (e.g. as the substitution of performance for 
experience) does the new paradigm, which Agamben traces to Chomsky’s refoundation 
of linguistics,2 not become recognisable as that of a whole galaxy of performance-related 
disciplines? In this galaxy, the Chomskyan constellation neighbours with socio-biology 
and other neo-post-neo-darwinist strands; yet we find also the economic analysis of law, 
a large gamut of current psychologies and, no doubt paradoxically, a methodologically 
ambitious enterprise such as Luhmann’s theory of societal modernity. Is the distinctive 
feature, then, less the object at stake than the dynamics it triggers? The intriguing feature 
is, then, not multi-disciplinarity or cross-disciplinarity but a more specific pattern – a 
certain displacement or metabasis eis allo genos (shift to a different genre) – by dint of 
which the social sciences subscribe to a biological model, law to an economic model, and 
literary criticism or psychoanalysis to mediatised popular culture. Multiple processes of 
liquidation or ‘boiling down’ have in this way re-drawn the face of the episteme and 
                                                 
1 See Agamben (2008), pp. 82-111 (109ff.); in the present volume: ‘Philosophical 
Archaeology’, section 16. 
2 Ibid. 
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given rise to an emergent network of new dependencies and hierarchies. The excessive 
success of Chomsky’s own discoveries has resulted in sidelining them by a process of 
colonisation and provoked incomparably more new work in the field of the neuro-
sciences than within linguistics itself. In his case as in others, that which figured as 
knowledge on one level (here: the linguistic level), figures on another level (the neuro-
linguistic, neuro-scientific level) as an opening to an indefinite potential for testing, 
performance, and self-re-enforcement.  
The a-historic, performance-related paradigm which Agamben correctly identifies as 
(if prematurely limits to) neuronal and genetic research programmes, has its most 
important ramifications outside the academy, in that it gives rise to new forms of political 
subjection. The cybernetic term ‘self-re-enforcement’ designates, in application to 
knowledge about man, at once a governmental reality – not in the sense of ‘executive 
branch’, but of ‘channelling conduct’ – and refers to Foucault’s analysis of arts of 
governing thirty years ago as much as to its supplementation by Agamben’s genealogy of 
government today (Agamben 2008, pp. 82-111 (109ff.). It is interesting to observe that 
political subjection itself has become ‘foucaultian’ over the decades since his death.3 
                                                 
3 Or is it Foucault who has ‘changed’ – after his death? Certain new readings of his 
work approach it effectively as a pyramid in the midst of which the mummy of a Pharao 
of legal theory had been patiently awaiting its discovery, all along. Foucault made fun of 
marxists as ‘traffic-wardens of the ideological traffic’; he marked his distance from the 
then ‘society’-obsessed Left, in the (almost excessively ironical) title ‘Society must be 
defended!’ Yet, the possibility that he could be interpreted as a legal theorist had not even 
occurred to him. The suggestion would have provoked merriment – or one of the 
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Instead of a governmental structure, the exercise of power over society within the limits 
of the rule of law, ensuring the undisturbed subjection of its subjects (as a means for 
establishing their felicitous co-existence, Aristotle’s eu zēn), governmental action is now 
understood as an effort to adapt to and cope with, urgencies, circumstances, ‘stuff [that] 
happens’; it is no longer structuralist, it is situationist. Elaborate arts of how best or most 
legitimately to govern populations and subjects, concocted throughout centuries, are 
replaced by the requirement of quickly coping with precarious circumstances. This 
‘coping’ replaces the templates of ceteris paribus conditions which have been the 
economists’ favourite paraphernalia for decades.  
Circumstances are not governable; this is how they differ from subjects. If ‘health is 
the silence of the organs’ (Canguilhem, 1966), a crisis is a noisy condition of the societal 
household. But a long-standing Western tradition has specialised in governing and in the 
creation of the subjectivity necessary to that effect; Foucault always made clear that his 
interest was in ‘gouverner les hommes’ (governing humans) not in steering 
circumstances. But the West is so passionate about subjectivity and governing humans 
that it has extended this double ticket to circumstances, to states, and produced a subject, 
namely the state, as an instrument for governing these. Circumstances or states outside 
                                                                                                                                                 
unstoppable homerical outbursts for which he was known in town. The point is that 
Foucault’s decisive ability has much more to do with this joyful distance than with a 
hidden legal theory. Engaging with one’s time, as Foucault understood it, did not mean 
subjecting oneself to its sovereign panacea and most cherished consensus. Throughout 
Foucault’s days, in the wake of ‘68, this sovereignly cherished object was ‘society’; this 
is no longer so; at the time at which I am writing, it is law. 
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the body do not even have pain as a means of making themselves known – they must rely 
on interpretation (guess whose). But they can play up; in which case an über-state or 
exceptional state, a new form of subjective encoding of states, becomes necessary in 
order to circumvent interpretation and deconstruction and to assert the imperative of 
‘coping’ and attention (the most precious commodity, according to Luhmann) under the 
threat of doom. The current neo-subjection is a by-product of ‘coping’ with 
circumstances; it is a collateral effect of increasingly precarious governmental decision-
making in increasingly exposed waters.  
Traditional subjection had typically been predicated upon a power that sustained 
some obscure but efficient deal with transcendence, now obliterated. Current neo-
subjection relies not on government’s power, but on its powerlessness. What is at stake in 
this travesty, this carnevalesque return? Throughout a few centuries now, transcendency-
signed power has proven amenable to domestication through checks and balances, 
charters, declarations, constitutions, etc. Their insufficiency used to be the main topic of 
politics. Now they are unaffordable. And the turn of instituted, categorical power into 
unadmitted, clandestine power is a reply to this situation. All power that acts, acts in the 
name of powerlessness. This means that it is straightforwardly not domesticable. This 
explains how it is possible that the new type of governmental subjection, which no longer 
flows from a transcendence-referred power but from a synapse within a network, an 
immanence, so spectacularly fails to free itself from what are, from a political or 
emancipatory view-point, power’s least enviable features. The exercise of power over 
society has been replaced by an exercise of care and vigilance for the conditions of 
‘running’ society, coping with its ‘household’ – oikonomia (not to be mixed up with post-
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Adam Smith market-’economy’) – maintaining its survival conditions. But what happens 
in the name of this ‘care’? We have heard so much, so often, about the august and 
imposing, even ‘unchallengeable’ sovereign who ‘decides about the state of exception’. 
Now, behind his back, uncannily, we see the rise of a new contender for his office, 
unspectacular and nonetheless superior, the household’s manager, steward, or oikonomos, 
whose role is no longer one of authorising or authoring imperatives, but of internally 
discovering and communicating information in view of ‘common survival’.  
In comparison with the power-wielding instantiation of sovereignty that dominates 
Carl Schmitt’s image-suffused and image-addicted interpretation of politics as a theatrical 
realm of essential visibility and manifestation, a secularised autodafé (act of faith), the 
new contender is not real - not a social reality in the way, say, in which, in the middle 
ages, a miracle-working ruler or saint was real. He is merely effective. Outlawed, 
invisible, anonymous, yet insuperably performing. Not a ruler or a saint, but a demon, or 
a dwarf. An often-commented page written by Walter Benjamin unfolds the image of a 
genius dwarf guiding, with the help of a complicated contraption of strings, the hands of 
a chess-playing puppet while hidden in a box below the chess-board. The delightfully 
dressed, hookah-puffing Turkish puppet stands, in Benjamin’s work, for ‘historical 
materialism’, and the miserly, hunchbacked dwarf enlisted in the puppet’s services, for 
theology (Benjamin 2003, p. 389; Benjamin 1978, p. 693). Revealing that the dwarf 
theology, small and ugly, ‘has to keep out of sight’ [kann … sich nirgendwo blicken 
lassen], Benjamin also offers a reason why he accepts the inconvenience of letting 
himself be imprisoned and invisibilised: it is, evidently, some state of pogrom or public 
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vendetta (against what? theology? dwarfs? ugliness? we are not told) to which he would 
fall prey as soon as he put his nose out of hiding. 
Between the unapparent-but-effective quality of Benjamin’s dwarf and the 
unapparent-but-effective quality of the manager or oikonomos (as a holder of impolitical 
decision-power), the relationship is complicated. Both transcend the typological gamut of 
embodiments of sovereignty during the schmittian (or ‘fascist’, if one is not yet tired of 
the word) age – the age, that is, of the modern revival of pre-modern structures of power: 
visible, representational, identity-fostering. Benjamin’s messianist take on history and 
revolution can be deciphered as an attempt to bring this age of sovereignty to an end 
while reconciling it with that end. Today, by means of a supplementary turn of the 
‘dialectic of the unforeseen’, the dwarfish champion is effectively the winner of the game 
– not, admittedly, on behalf of historical materialism for which he had been invented but, 
surely and ironically, on behalf of the unseen, non-manifest, purely adaptive power of 
oikonomia. In the role of the loser we find the schmittian, spectacle-addicted sovereign, 
victim of the generalised reliance upon the unapparent (dwarfish) approach to invisible 
power. The impressive paradigm of Schmitt’s political state-of-exception is replaced by 
the unapparent routine of continuing self-reproduction – concretely, by social autopoiesis 
as the supreme form of oikonomia.  
Yet, while supposedly putting an end to the notorious despotism of traditional 
political subjection by replacing it with an impolitical mere default routine ‘without 
qualities’, post-sovereign governmentality cannot help revivifying, indeed exacerbating, 
half-furtively, half-comically, the same injustice and cruelty that have been, throughout 
the ages of history and the multiplicity of cultures, the company of inequalities, 
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exclusions and hierarchies. The concept of ‘crisis’ helps to make disaster ubiquitary and 
familiar. French legislation has made the fact of ‘helping’ illegal immigrants – inviting 
someone to stay over, serving him tea, etc. – liable to criminal prosecution (the so-called 
‘délit de solidarité’). The crisis-paradigm makes enjoinable what would not be enjoinable 
otherwise. The ‘crisis’ replaces the ‘catastrophe’, which offered no argument for surplus 
subjection in a preventive, ante eventum way, as no governmental action can plausibly 
claim to prevent a catastrophe and mobilise in favour of such a meta-imperative. The 
substitution of the governable crisis for the ungovernable catastrophe, and the integration 
of disaster-avoidance to governmental action, impressively mark the turbulent growth of 
the range of government which has accompanied the past decades of economic growth.4  
Agamben never refers to Luhmann, even if ‘routine’ and ‘priority of the urgent’ 
modes of dealing with decision-making are decisive for replacing politically represented 
                                                 
4 We ‘crisis-mongers’ – to use a term pioneered by ‘The Times’ in 1841 (according to 
the Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford 1987, Supplement/vol. III, p. 681) – should be 
informed about the rules of our favourite language game: a genealogical catalogue 
raisonné of the term becomes in itself an urgency. Its topoi would have to include the 
1929 ‘krach’ and post-1929 ‘big depression’ (described in these two words by their 
contemporaries and victims), but also the Cuban Missiles Crisis of 1962 as well as, on the 
other hand, the history of the science of commercial cycles, and of course the principal 
philosophical Krisis-’monger’, Edmund Husserl. A 1929-published French encyclopaedia 
reports sub verbo ‘crisis’: ‘rapid change in the course of a disease, which is almost 
always a good omen and presages recovery’ (Le Larousse du XX e siècle, vol.II, p. 582; 
[my trans.]).    
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subjection with bare oikonomic subjection. Yet it is precisely here where the common 
part of the thinking journeys of the sociologist, Niklas Luhmann and the philosopher, 
Giorgio Agamben, ends. Autopoietic social theory’s undeniable advance over any 
competing model in today’s social scientific horizon is predicated on its adamant anti-
moralist and anti-normativist abstention. Luhmann’s way of subscribing to Heidegger’s 
injunction of ‘Gelassenheit’ consists in the fact that all terms (operational closure, self-
reference, autopoiesis itself) are less solutions than refusals of premature solutions. One 
might call this Luhmann’s ‘epistemethics’. But there is, on the other hand, Luhmann’s 
‘bureaudicy’:5 autopoiesis-theory, as an unending ‘homage to routine’ (a self-
description), offers a self-description of society under the law of ‘coping’, an analysis of 
society in terms of oikonomia and, therefore, neo-governmentality.  
The ‘routine’ and ‘priority of the urgent’ styles of decision-making are instrumental 
for the bare oikonomic subjection that tends to replace politically represented subjection. 
Everything looks as if the task of autopoiesis-theory was integrally included within the 
field of this ‘doing’. Even so, and whether or not it is judged methodologically 
                                                 
5 Even in the absence of justificatory intent, there is no doubt about Luhmann’s inner-
worldly continuation of Leibnizian theo-motives. Along with Leibniz’ Essais de 
théodicée (‘attempts of the justification of God’), 1710, see Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet’s 
Traité du libre arbitre, 1677 (quoted after : Oeuvres choisies, vol.IV, Paris 1981, p. 
64ff.), whose claim that God governs the world as if it governed itself provides Agamben 
(Il Regno e la Gloria, p. 313f), with his ultimate and key-stone reference. By claiming 
that creatures proceed, behave, act, govern themselves, etc., according to their own 
resolutions and rationalities, Bossuet offers a strictly autopoietic description. 
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worthwhile to limit one’s outlook to action-events or évènementalité (Foucault 1990, pp. 
35-63),6 being is the white spot on the map of the new societas faber, which autopoiesis-
theory substitutes for the ancient notion of a fabricating man, homo faber. There is no 
ideology-style denial to be found in Luhmann. The fact is nonetheless that being shows 
when and if they do, in connection with the epistemo-theology of the 15th century bishop 
Nicholas of Kues. The problem here is not ‘man’ – it is not luhmannism’s anti-humanism 
that is problematic: it is subjection. Whereas adaptation, ‘coping’, decision-making, do 
(and therefore show on the autopoietic screen), subjection is – and remains invisible. 
Autopoiesis-theory has cut itself lose from being; a lot of oikonomic knowledge has 
thereby been gained; the price is that the bi-polar structure has fallen into foreclosure.   
Let us recapitulate: the second pole of the bipolar structure which cannot be 
approached by social-scientific or systemic means can be denied. It can be externalised. 
Those thinkers who refuse to do either are, generally, the philosophers. Their message is 
not always good news. The first among them, Anaximander, has been adamant about the 
impossibility of a structural displacement, a definitive interruption of the circle of 
righting or revenge. Any evolution in these fields was deemed irredeemably precarious 
and condemned to be resolved by a counter-evolution, like the swing of a pre-existing 
pendulum. Agamben’s study of oikonomia/government and Power/Glory focuses at both 
poles. Different from Anaximander, the second pole is no longer understood as ‘revenge’, 
but as Glory (or in Greek: doxa). Bi-polarity in Agamben’s treatise relates to the 
coordination between the power-equipped but uselessly immobile ‘glorious’ instances of 
                                                 
6 Foucault’s term, but one that fits Luhmann’s characterisation of modern society as 
the momentary product of communications. Foucault (1990), pp. 35-63. 
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reign and power, and the powerless and faceless, yet irresistible operations of ‘coping’: 
long-term crisis management and emergency governance. It refrains from suggesting a 
reduction of the two poles to one.  
The bi-polar conception both replaces and aggravates the traditional genteel tension 
between pouvoir constitué and pouvoir constituant. It introduces in its stead the 
irreconcilable split and consummate mutual exteriority of non-governing power and 
governing non-power. The longstanding and proverbially resilient figure of a social 
contract itself is dissolved or de-mediatised. The Greek noun authentēs designates a 
person who has committed (as opposed to have merely instigated) an action or a deed, 
e.g. perpetrated a murder or executed a death penalty (Liddell and Scott 1996). That 
politics can be authentic in this strict sense is evidenced by any actor, whether collective 
or individual, who holds power and endeavours to bring it to fruition in, first, making her 
or his choice, then sticking to it against whatever resistance it might encounter. Where the 
calculus of the optimising and/or maximising of mere means – or, in other words, the 
care for the household – has absorbed the margin of manoeuvre of political choice, and 
subordinated politics to its own adaptive strategies, politics has, if one looks below the 
mask of its semantic and mediatic flourishing, really disappeared or persists only in a 
transformed state, as mimicry-politics or inauthentic politics.  
This inauthenticity is what is epitomised by the notion of a crisis. What creates an 
inauthentic totality is, technically speaking, the split of the nexus of action and being. 
Politics, under the take-over by oikonomia, changes radically: it is no longer in 
possession of the (in a sense) ‘sovereign’ and in any case incomparable rank it has been 
variously invested with throughout times ancient, medieval, early modern and modern. 
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What Agamben’s review of the institutional archives shows is that the intimate bond 
between monarchic oikonomia and polyarchic politics (as Aristotle refers to them7) is not 
new but, on the contrary, immemorial. Politics, as upright and principled, the site of 
power, courage, challenge, commitment and generosity, had been at every point liable to 
a Moebius-like connection with its other side: adaptive and opportunistic, caring and 
coping oikonomia which was busily monitoring the continuation of conditions that allow 
the polis to flourish. Both poles always coexisted in such intimate entanglement that the 
very idea of an autonomous ‘history of politics’ seems radically less obvious than it is 
often assumed. Yet, Agamben claims, we are witnessing today an oikonomia that absorbs 
and overtakes its other political side, giving rise to an evolution through which the bi-
polar map of government and power, exercise and possession and, ultimately, praxis and 
being, is abusively unified by the paradoxical Machtergreifung of powerless 
government.8  
It is barely surprising, then, that the philosophical question of the human sciences 
today and their ‘ultimate ontological anchoring’9 that underlies the passing from the 
transformative grammar of the indo-europeanists of the 19th and 20th century (Saussure, 
                                                 
7 Oikonomikos, I,1 (1343a): ‘Politics is of many masters (hē … politikē ek pollōn 
archóntōn estín), economics is of only one (hē oikonomikē … monarchía)’. Cf. Agamben 
(2007) p. 20ff., 57. The first book of the Oikonomikos is now considered as a genuine 
work of Aristotle by many authorities. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See Agamben 2008, pp. 82-111 (109ff.); in the present volume: ‘Philosophical 
Archaeology’ (section 16) 
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Benveniste, Jakobson, Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, Jonathan Z. Smith) to Chomsky’s 
generative grammar,10 acquires from this point of view a new and unique importance. 
Equally unsurprising is the performative model’s seizure of power over the human 
sciences. After all, it needs to be acknowledged – admittedly, under the previous, historic 
paradigm, the human sciences have immensely advanced the knowledge of human 
cultures and institutions: legal, political, religious (as well as anti-legal, anti-political, 
anti-religious). Yet, they have proven remarkably unproductive as to generating more 
effective ways to programme, steer or govern the course of enterprises and households. 
Their prowesses have been strictly limited to matters of scholarship and knowledge.  
That a rule supposes a ruler was obvious to John Austin. How should a command be 
formulated in the absence of an assignable command-giving authority? Hans Kelsen 
encounters the claim that a norm always and necessarily refers back to an identifiable 
author when he reads contemporary logician and philosopher of science Walter 
Dubislav.11 Unsurprisingly, considering his neo-kantian interest in norms and their 
interpretation as ‘abstract objects’, Kelsen examines the question only from the vantage 
point of logical reconstruction of a legal order striving for self-consistency.12 Seventy 
years later, another aspect emerges, beyond the subtlety of the logical issue. The 
discrepancy between the deficiency of legitimate power to issue imperatives, and the 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Kelsen (1991), p. 23ff. ‘No imperative without imperator’, Walter Dubislav’s 
original claim, is in Dubislav (1937), pp. 330 ff.  
12 Michael Steven Green (2003), pp. 365-413, calls Kelsen, therefore, the ‘Frege of 
law’. 
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overabundance of effective imperatives, constitutes the ultimately distinguishing fact and 
the intimately critical aspect of the Western-Christian history of institutional power.  
Today, there is no legitimate power left anywhere on earth […] The integral legalisation and economisation 
of human relations and the confusion between what we can believe, hope, love, and that which we are 
required to do and not to do, to say and not to say, [convicts] all the powerful of the world themselves of 
illegitimacy (Agamben 2009).13  
If this is so, what are governments, managements, managers – in short, decision-making 
agents? We know what they do. What does the proliferation of power-imposing, power-
exercising agents, who fail to be legitimate holders of the powers they use, confront us 
with? The Latin word ‘minister’ (servant) is formed after the preposition minus. The 
history of executive power – the power whose secret is the disappearance of the question 
of its being behind its action – stands in the sign, ‘less’. But ‘less’ with respect to what?  
Agamben sees the place of this ‘less’, of this minus of ministry, of this ‘comma’ of 
the non-coincidence between sovereign power and ministerial care, already present in the 
tension between creation and redemption. This supposes that, on the one hand, 
notwithstanding all ‘separation theses’, law and religion are connected. They are one in 
the unstable and duplicitous nature of the Western-Christian borderline-version of 
monotheism. The poles at stake in the long history of this domesticated antagonism are 
the creator-God Christianism has inherited from its ‘Old Testament’, and its genuinely 
ecclesial contribution, the curator-God, caretaker-God, or trustee-God of the New 
Testament: the Son, born a man and carrying a human name and identity, Jesus, put to 
death as a hostage and host of human guilt and a victim of human power. ‘Christ’ is the 
                                                 
13 Translated from Agamben (2009), pp. 27-36 (35). 
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name or, to be precise, the official title (gr. ‘Christos’ just translates the Hebrew word 
‘messiah’, meaning ‘the anointed’14) of the trustee in whose service and action (used in 
another’s name and power) the government of the world, the care for the world, and 
indeed the care for the care for the world, emerge within the history of God. Christ and 
the event of incarnation mark the point at which a new chapter of God’s history starts, a 
chapter no longer written in the sign of the strict monotheism of a creator-God to which 
every life remains indebted, but in the sign of an agency that is in charge of an existing 
creation and its household. This agency or household is the God who, both in spite of and 
in virtue of the enigma this involves, is at once one and three.15  
Since the advent of his second and third person, God himself has become an 
oikonomic entity and has taken up the duty of caring for and governing his creation. But 
the basic building blocks of the trinitarian creed have been laid in the life-time and, 
mostly, also the presence of Constantine the Great, the first Christian Roman Emperor, in 
the earlier 4th century. The history of the West and its (once-)celebrated ‘take-off’, is 
courtesy to the Christian God who has accepted to carry the cross once again, and to act, 
not according to the sovereign whim or privilege wielded by a master of the universe, but 
humbly in the sign of the minus of ministry, the limited means of government and 
governmental care. God cares for the world, as a supplement to creation, and as the 
model of human government that has been followed by governmental rationality during 
                                                 
14 Cf. the chapter entitled ‘Proper name’, in Agamben (2005).  
15 This paragraph (as the next three, and large sections of many other paragraphs as 
well) offers little more than a short, tentative and schematic reading of the historical 
vision unfolded in Agamben’s Regno e la Gloria.  
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the entire Western-Christian cum Western-postchristian episode. Meanwhile, the 
theology-born model of power under self-denial, or ‘minus of ministry’ – whose hidden 
centres today are crisis-management, acting under necessity, taking urgent measures, 
acquiescing to collateral damages, etc. – has become nameless, secular and globalised.16  
Decisively, the Christian God’s becoming-man entails the move of taking up the 
leading role within the servicing of the creation, and the charge of assuring its continuity 
in time. The argument that the Christian message and movement are of some uncanny 
importance for the unfolding of the structures (of power and law, for instance) generally 
known as ‘Western’, is widespread today. What is this argument about? Basically, the 
‘Christian thing’ about Western history resides in the fact that God’s governmental or 
managerial turn has no equivalent with the unique gods of the other religions even of the 
abrahamic family. These unique gods have in a sense neglected their administrative 
training. The Christological learning process of the God of the New Testament might 
well be understood, in this sense, as the paradigm of all ‘progress’. It proceeds suspended 
upon an institutional reform of political power, which both determines and dwarfs later, 
including modern and current evolutions – evolutions which can now be deciphered as a 
sequence of re-makes, masks, aliases, transcriptions and other encryptions (or 
‘secularisations’, if one has still not had enough of this word) – of the tension of the 
creating and the caring/managing God, of Theology and Christology.  
                                                 
16 See Agamben (2007), chs. 2 and 3 (pp. 31-82) on the oppositions and controversies 
which provoke, surround and follow the trinitarian re-foundation of the Christian God, in 
reply to the Arian sect, at the First Council of Nicaea (321). 
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Yet, the way that leads from the created creation to the manageable creation is 
(anything but unquestionable?) questionable. Genesis tells us that after accomplishing the 
creation, God, far from now managing it, rests. There is no question of an oikonomos 
responding to the requirements of its maintenance, servicing, and protection; no mention 
that the creation is a household with a future of exposure to dangers and risks on a 
permanent basis, thus in constant need of further attention and protection, government, 
control, providence. All that creation needs is its creatures to inhabit it. The household 
view is Christian only, and it is additionally linked to the increase of the Church’s social 
responsibilities, when governmental care for appropriate ways of dealing with creation’s 
precarious predicatedness upon an unstable and risk-suffused outside becomes the 
overriding preoccupation. Yet, all of this represents, once again, only one pole. If 
governing requires incomparably more power than any existing authority could possess, 
give or distribute; if, in other words, ‘le roi règne, mais il ne gouverne pas’, then the real 
issue we are confronted with is clearly that of the other side of government. What 
becomes of creation power once creation has fallen into the caring and disposing hands of 
its ‘management’?  
Agamben, following the relationship of power and government throughout the 
European longue durée – carving, as it were, the secular cross of ministerial or 
governmental activism on the one hand, and of the projections of power and liturgies of 
glory, on the other hand – is not preoccupied by paradoxes but, rather, by doxa – that is to 
say, glory itself. His methodologically unshackled and historically overhauled version of 
Foucault’s analysis of governmentality offers, in this sense, what might effectively be 
understood as a meta-theory of luhmannian autopoiesis: the autopoietic system, in the 
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light of this meta-theory, appears as the most advanced version of ‘oikonomic’ action and 
rationality. The distance to Foucault is in the claim – one of the key arguments of Il 
Regno e la Gloria - that liturgical praises (doxologies) show one common model of doxa, 
glory and splendour, underlying their attribution to God on the one hand, and to the 
monarchic ruler on the other hand.17  
The approximation of divine and mundane authorities covers an unending list of 
theologico-political implications. Yet, the decisive point lies neither on the side of glory 
and liturgical praises, nor on that of the ministerially well-adapted fashions of guiding a 
household through the pitfalls of its crisis – and ‘crisis’ should be taken, to some 
important extent, as an endemic, consubstantial or permanent condition. It lies in their 
mutual exposure and in the redrawing of their constant (if constantly suppressed or 
marginalised) co-ordination. The minimalist notion of a mere mutual exposure is of the 
essence: no positive bond or even relationship of the two poles can be indicated. Yet, the 
light their choreographic disposition throws at the older polito-logical and legal-
theoretical riddle of the ‘imperative without imperator’ deserves attention. It brings up 
the notion of a power, that cannot be justified or defined (or even spotted), but that yet 
stands in effective use (that of crisis-management as ultimate government), and that 
coexists purely externally with its opposite; a power that appears (in the media as earlier 
in the churches) but that cannot be used. Beyond the paradoxical pas de deux of an 
oikonomic governance enforcing its decrees in the name of its power’s deficiency, and a 
glorious sovereignty deprived of means of making any ‘difference that would make a 
                                                 
17 Agamben (2007), chs. 7 and 8, pp. 187 ff., and 219 ff. On Habermas, consensus, 
government by consent, their analysis in liturgical terms, pp. 280-3. 
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difference’ (information, according to Bateson’s definition), the way is free to the 
conditio post-politica of a subjectivity without subject exposed to a power itself subjected 
to self-denial.  
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